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AND

OPPOSITION

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Western Europe and the Commonwealth: Latin America is totally excluded. Secondly, several European countries are not mentioned, specifically Ireland, Norway, Denmark and Finland: one has to assume that this is because no constitutional debate took place in these countries; but, even if this were the case, it would be interesting to know why. A systematic coverage must obviously include both the countries in which change took place and the countries in which there was no change.

This is particularly so because the book opens (and closes) with general considerations and even includes a first part on the history and theory of constitutions. This suggests that we need a much clearer understanding of the development of constitutions. Professor S. E. Finer's chapter on that history provides a first insight, in under twenty pages, of what such a history might be. He rightly considers the problem on a world-wide basis; he confronts us, in a truly original manner, with the question as to whether 'constitutionalism' in its various meanings, is a Western invention which corresponds to a particular type of policy which the West has aimed at developing; but, as Professor S. E. Finer himself states, these are *Notes* towards a history of constitutions: it is clear that such a history must be written, both in terms of the world-wide context in which Western constitutionalism has come to emerge and in terms of a detailed analysis of what Mr V. Bogdanor describes as the six (or seven) stages of constitutional development which the West has known since the eighteenth century.

The purpose of the analysis must also be theoretical: some elements of a theory are developed, in part in the chapters on various countries, and in part by Mr V. Bogdanor in his overall Introduction and Professor G. Ionescu in the chapter which he devotes to theory; but these are only elements of a full treatment of the subject. The idea of the 'reactive' constitution is an interesting step towards a classification which would go beyond the historical sequence, but there is no developed typology. There is a strong call, in Mr V. Bogdanor's Introduction, for an acceptance of the point that constitutional and political development are closely intertwined and that there is reciprocal influence of one on the other (a matter which Professor O. Ruin explores very successfully in the chapter on Sweden). But, now that our appetite has been whetted, there has to be a further step in the direction of formulating such a theory. The present volume is truly informative: this information is necessary for the construction of a theory. In the process problems are brought to light, but expectations aroused as we become eager to understand better the nature of the links between constitutionalism and political behaviour need to be fulfilled.

Brendan O'Leary: Twenty Years a-Warring and Twenty Years a-Writing

Paul Arthur and Keith Jeffery: *Northern Ireland Since 1968*, Oxford, Institute of Contemporary British History/Basil Blackwell, 1988, 120 pp., £5.95.

The writers of this brief ninety-seven page survey of the last two decades of the history of Northern Ireland correctly note that 'Even after two decades of violent conflict Northern Ireland rates sparse mention in general Vth form or undergraduate textbooks concerned with contemporary British history and politics. It is as if authors consider Northern Ireland alien to the British political experience'.¹ This quarantining of Northern Ireland from the rest of British civilization is illustrated by Dennis Kavanagh's well-received *Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus?*² which completely neglects the IRA/INLA hunger strikes of 1980-81, the election of Bobby Sands to the Westminster Parliament and the IRA's attempt to murder the British Cabinet at Brighton in 1984. Kavanagh's book also fails to discuss the breakdown of bipartisan consensus between the two main British political parties over the management and future status of Northern Ireland, or the Anglo-Irish Agreement — one of Mrs Thatcher's few statesman-like acts. However, these strange omissions are not confined to textbooks or surveys of the political science of British politics. With honourable exceptions the same pattern is true in British historical, sociological and political science journals. Arthur and Jeffery's explanation of this sparse attention — the widespread perception that Northern Ireland is regarded as alien to the British 'way of life' — is correct, but limited. They fail to observe that neglect of Northern Ireland is greatest amongst *English* political scientists in *English* institutions. Arend Lijphart and Richard Rose are world-renowned scholars who have written on Northern Ireland.³ They also share not being English. The English political scientists and philosophers who have written on Northern Ireland have normally been connected with Irish universities — like John Whyte or Frank Wright,⁴ or

¹ The textbook, *Developments in British Politics* (edited by H. Drucker, P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble and G. Peele) is a distinct exception to this pattern, as it always devotes one essay to Northern Ireland.

² D. Kavanagh, *Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus*, Oxford University Press, 1987.

³ A. Lijphart, 'The Northern Ireland Problem: Cases, Theories and Solutions', *British Journal of Political Science*, V, 1, 1975, pp. 83-106; R. Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective*, Faber & Faber, 1971; and *Northern Ireland: A Time of Choice*, Macmillan, 1976.

⁴ J. Whyte, 'Interpretations of the Northern Ireland Problem: An Appraisal', *Economic and Social Review*, 9, 4, 1978; 'How is the boundary maintained between the two communities in Northern Ireland?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 9, 2, 1986 and F. Wright, *Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis*, Gill & Macmillan, 1987.

they have had Irish connections, like Anthony Kenny.⁵ Judging by my bibliography on Northern Ireland, which contains over 5,000 items, most of the important research on Northern Ireland has been carried out by academics attached to Northern Irish, Irish, US and Australian institutions. The obvious exceptions to these generalizations, the writings of British counter-insurgency specialists and 'experts' on terrorism, merely show why social scientists are often held in justifiably poor esteem.⁶ English intellectual neglect of Northern Ireland resembles that of British governments before 1972: the territory is regarded as a troublesome, exceptional and insoluble cancer which fortunately is not terminal for, or integral to, British politics. Many centuries of British domination of Ireland have left an enduring mark upon English intellectuals. There is undoubtedly a collective repression of responsibility in their neglect of the history of Ireland and Northern Ireland.⁷

English negligence is not the only explanation of the sparse attention paid to Northern Ireland in British politics textbooks and journals. There are serious problems of objectivity, access, funding and political controversy attached to researching and writing about Northern Ireland, factors which decisively affect academic production.⁸ Arthur and Jeffery do not emphasize these problems sufficiently. In Northern Ireland public opinion polls and surveys are notoriously unreliable, consistently exaggerating the support for moderate political positions (because pollsters are afraid of the murderous fate which befell a 1981 census enumerator in Derry and because respondents are reluctant to express their authentic extremism to strangers). Reporting by academics on submerged civil war creates conflicts of interest (and loyalty), especially when the state which pays their salaries has frequently engaged in actions of dubious legality and legitimacy. Access to the key actors in Northern Ireland conflict, appeals to fund research, and asking hard questions of politicians and administrators pose questions of 'soundness' and (at least perceptions of) personal danger. Such considerations may

⁵ A. Kenny, *The Road to Hillsborough*, Pergamon Press, 1986.

⁶ See my Review Article in the *British Journal of Criminology*, 28, 1, pp. 97-107, 1988.

⁷ A recent depressing example of this trait, compounded by unthinking racist characterization of the Irish, was Anthony Burgess's review of Michael Holroyd's biography of George Bernard Shaw (*Cuaraidin*, 16 September 1988). Burgess completely misinterpreted Shaw's *John Bull's Other Island*, and praised Shaw's 'very un-Irish logicity'. Such failures of comprehension, arrogance and racism are all too common amongst English intellectuals in their discussions of the Irish. I have lost count of the number of times intelligent English people have sincerely told me that I am a 'bright Irishman' — as if this pair of words was a surprising paradox.

⁸ See especially John Whyte, *Is Research on the Northern Ireland Problem Worthwhile?* Inaugural Lecture, The Queen's University Belfast, 1983 and Rupert Taylor, 'Social Scientific Research on the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland: The Problem of Objectivity', *The Economic and Social Review*, 19, 2, 1988, pp. 123-45.

have led many English academics to conclude that studying Northern Ireland may not be good for their careers. What else can explain their indifference to the complexities of a conflict which fascinates the world's media, and political scientists and historians outside England?

The two authors, on the staff of the University of Ulster, have written a brief introduction to Northern Ireland, intended to increase knowledge of the nature of the conflict in British schools and higher education curricula. *Northern Ireland Since 1968* is not a contemporary history, despite its title and the series in which it is included. It is neither chronological nor based on primary sources. Rather it is a thematic essay in which five topics are considered: the immediate background to the current conflict in the civil rights movement of the 1960s; the social and economic distinctiveness of Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK; Northern Ireland's communal politics (Catholics and Protestants); 'peacekeeping'; and the international dimensions to the conflict. On these five topics the book is generally very useful and accurate. For other topics readers will have to look elsewhere.

Two questions must be addressed in evaluating this book's merits. First, is it a good introductory text? Second, is its selection of themes appropriate? As an introductory book it does not succeed in replacing Paul Arthur's own very competent and readable textbook, *The Government and Politics of Northern Ireland*,⁹ which was also aimed at sixth formers and first year undergraduates. The latter gave students a much better grasp of the historical and institutional context in which the conflict takes place. Moreover, as a thematic essay *Northern Ireland Since 1968* is too brief and disorganized in conception to be memorable or pedagogically effective.

The authors concede that others may have followed different patterns of selection of themes for treatment (p. 4). However, they nowhere justify the ones they chose to highlight. Neither political scientists nor historians will find Arthur and Jeffery's themes the most appropriate to win interested students to the study of Northern Ireland. Constraints of space may have led the authors to omit extended coverage of Northern Ireland's political parties and party system, but these are crucial subjects for any understanding of the dynamics of the current conflict and the constraints within which British and Irish policy-makers operate. Secondly, they did not find time for a thorough analytical treatment of the vicissitudes of British policy-making since 1968. In the last two decades, through an unhappy synthesis of ineptitude, wishful thinking, vacillation and general uncertainty, British policy-makers have succeeded in rekindling the fires of Irish nationalism, building a social base for Sinn Féin in the ghettos of Belfast and Derry, and exacerbating Protestant/Unionist defensiveness and paranoia. This

⁹ P. Arthur, *The Government and Politics of Northern Ireland*, Longman, second edition, 1984.

story needs to be told and explained in a book called *Northern Ireland Since 1968*. A fuller analytical treatment of the costs and benefits of the options open to British policy-makers (full integration of Northern Ireland into the Republic or into Britain, internationalization, arbitration, promoting consociationalism or local power-sharing, and repatriation) is surely necessary in a pedagogical work of this kind. Finally, insufficient attention is paid to the development of the ideologies and cultures of the rival segments and factions within the segments. These three omissions are doubly unfortunate as there is a considerable secondary literature from which the authors could have drawn, and because these are subjects which interest students.

The book also suffers from being published when insufficient time has elapsed to evaluate the progress of the Anglo-Irish Agreement—on which the jury still remains out. However the major complaint for readers of this journal of comparative politics must be that *Northern Ireland Since 1968* does not attempt to use political science or comparative historical research to illuminate the conflict, or as a basis for sane policy analysis. The authors do not draw from the key debates in the political science of divided societies—which centre on the merits of Arend Lijphart's theory of consociationalism and Eric Nordlinger's theory of conflict regulation.¹⁰ They do not employ the very useful theoretical and comparative literature on nationalism developed in postwar sociology, political science and history.¹¹ Finally, they do not use the insights generated by comparative historical studies on the impact of settlers in state-building.¹² Incorporating these theories, perspectives and debates into a textbook need not demand the use of extensive jargon or the construction of four-hundred page tomes to explain the basic arguments and controversies. This literature not only helps explain Northern Ireland but also might excite British students' intellectual interests in segmented societies, state-building and nationalism. They might then understand that Northern Ireland, far from being exceptional and atypical, has much in common with many divided regions in other parts of the world. They might also appreciate better Britain's responsibilities for the conflict and its corresponding duties.

¹⁰ See *inter alia* A. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977 and E. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Centre for International Affairs, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 1972.

¹¹ See *inter alia* E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Basil Blackwell, 1983.

¹² I. Lustick, *State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria*, Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, 1985. Lustick's recently published *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, New York Council on Foreign Relations, is also relevant for comparative analysis.

Ivor Porter: Harry Hopkins—the Other President

George McJinsey: *Harry Hopkins: Ally of the Poor and Defender of Democracy*, Harvard University Press, 1987, 474 pp., £19.95.

Read against the economic and social climate of today the story of Harry Hopkins could almost pass for fiction. He judged an economic system by 'the number of persons who shared its rewards', yet had a passion for racing, good food, and exotic holidays. He started life as a social worker and by 1936, when he wrote *Spending to Save*, he was in control of two billion dollars and 2.5 million jobs. At the age of fifty-three, when he accompanied Roosevelt to the summit conference at Teheran, he was probably the second most influential man in the US Administration—the 'other president' as *Time* dubbed him.

George McJinsey in this refreshingly new and well documented biography portrays the Second World War through the eyes of Roosevelt and Hopkins so successfully that one is sometimes inclined to put the book down for a moment and consider these events outside the narrow, somewhat domestic perspective of the White House. Whereas Churchill, who already had a broad historical sense and a passion for international affairs, made full use of the Foreign Office, Roosevelt, who had neither, was encouraged by Hopkins to cut himself off from the State Department. He took Hopkins, but not Secretary of State Hull, to the critical summit meetings of 1943.

That the outspoken, witty, ill Harry Hopkins was an outstanding negotiator and presidential envoy became clear during his first visit to Churchill in January 1941. On that occasion he not only gave Roosevelt a precise estimate of the munitions Britain needed, he also helped Churchill with a speech—'give us the tools and we will finish the job'—which had just the right bi-partisan approach to get the Lend-Lease bill through Congress.

Yet once Roosevelt had entered the war with allies of such differing backgrounds as Churchill and Stalin, Hopkins seemed often only to compound the President's prejudices. He looked forward, for instance, to a postwar world without the colonialist Churchill, but seemed quite unable to assess Stalin's imperialism. As late as June 1945 he was still dismissing Churchill's warnings about the Russians as 'overwrought and insubstantial'.

Professor McJinsey suggests that Roosevelt and Hopkins set out to win Stalin over to the concept of a postwar world rid of Axis and Colonial powers where the peace would be kept by the 'United Nations' led by the USA and the USSR. After Churchill, with Dunkirk in mind, had refused to sanction what would in 1942 have been a suicide operation into western France, they accused him of dragging his feet over a second front—which was not true—and of harbouring imperialist ambitions—which the flamboyant prime minister seemed to confirm